The effects of uniting separated markets, each monopolized by a producer, into a globalized oligopolistic market, which is regarded as a non-cooperative game, are investigated. The cases where such globalization degrades the profits or surpluses of all producers, are examined. Linear demand and production functions are considered. The revenues of producers and consumers are assumed to be independent. It is shown that in complete symmetry, the degree of such degradation is highest, where the degree means the lowest of the degrees of the surplus degradation among all producers. The system is in complete symmetry when the values of parameters describing all producers and markets are identical. On the other hand, the degree of consumer surplus improvement is highest in some symmetry, where the degree means the lowest of the degrees of consumer surplus improvement among all (previously separated) markets. The system is in the symmetry when the values of parameters describing all producers are identical.
Introduction
It is anticipated that bringing the connection among separated sub-systems may benefit, at least, some of the sub-systems. This is not always the case, however, as exemplified in the Braess paradox on transportation and communication networks (Braess, 1968; Murchland, 1970; Frank, 1981; Cohen and Kelly, 1990; Cohen and Jeffries, 1997; Korilis et al., 1995; Korilis et al., 1999; Kameda, 2002) , the Braess-like paradox on distributed computer systems (Kameda et al., 2000; Kameda and Pourtallier, 2002) , or, more generally, the payoff matrix of the well-known prisoners' dilemma, etc. That is, there exist cases where the costs of all users degrade by such addition of the connection.
The lowest among the degrees of the cost degradation for all users (players) by increasing the connection, is considered the measure showing the degree of paradoxical cost degradation. The reason for considering this measure is given in Section 2. Numerical investigations (Kameda et al., 2001b) extended from the result (Kameda et al., 2000) on distributed computer systems, suggested the conjecture that the degree of paradoxical cost degradation due to adding the connection, is highest in complete symmetry, i.e., the lowest among the degrees of the degradation for all the players is highest when the values of parameters describing the players are identical. For systems that have linear node costs and fixed communication delays but are the same as the above systems in other respects, it has been analytically shown that the degree of paradoxical cost degradation is highest in complete symmetry (Kameda et al., 2001a) . Note, in passing, that there are cases of symmetrical systems where the degree of paradoxical cost degradation can increase without bound (Kameda and Pourtallier, 2002) . In addition, it has been shown that the degree of paradoxical cost degradation in the network originally studied by Braess (1968) is highest in symmetry (Kameda, 2002) . It has been difficult, however, to prove in a general manner that the conjecture applies to different systems. It is interesting to gain more insight into such paradoxical degradation, and to examine the above conjecture on systems of economics (Samuelson (1967) , Intriligator (1971) , Dixit (1987) , Krugman (1994), etc.) . Although the problem is very general, it may be difficult to analyze a model that covers all possible situations. The present paper shows the results that have been obtained on a rather specialized model that has been analytically tractable to us so far.
The present paper investigates a system consisting of multiple producers (see e.g., Intriligator (1971) ). Each producer can produce the commodity of the same kind.
Two situations are considered, separated (before globalization) and united (after globalization). In the separated situation, each producer monopolizes a market that has a separate demand of the commodity. Each producer optimizes its profit or surplus in producing the amount of the commodity demanded in the market, separately. On the other hand, in the united situation, all producers are associated with a single globalized market assembled from previously separated markets. It is an oligopolistic situation. Each producer optimizes its profit or surplus in producing the amount of the commodity demanded in the globalized market non-cooperatively and competitively. In the optimized situation, each producer cannot receive any further benefit by changing its decision. This optimized situation is a Nash equilibrium.
The present paper considers mainly the producer surplus, that is, the profit plus the production cost fixed for each producer. Thus, the minimization of the profit for a producer is the same as that of the surplus for the producer. The present paper discusses possible cases where such surplus degradation occurs coincidently for all producers. The inverse of the ratio of the surplus after globalization to the surplus before globalization for a producer, is considered the degree of the surplus degradation for the producer. Producers that have a smaller ratio, have a higher degree of producer surplus degradation. Then, the lowest of the degrees of the surplus degradation for all producers is considered the measure of producer surplus degradation due to market globalization. That is, if the markets are united, all producers have the degree of surplus degradation higher than the value of the measure. Complete symmetry means the situation where the values of parameters describing the producers and the markets are identical. It can be easily seen that in complete symmmetry, all producers have surplus degradation and all markets enjoy consumer surplus improvement, both coincidently, as comfirmed in Subsection 4.2. This study shows that the value of the measure is largest in complete symmetry. On the other hand, it is observed that in some symmetry, the degree of consumer surplus improvement is highest. The ratio of the consumer surplus in the globalized situation to that in the separated situation for a market, is considered the degree of consumer surplus improvement for the market. Markets that have a greater value of the ratio, have a greater degree of consumer surplus improvement. The lowest of the degrees of consumer surplus improvement for all markets is considered the measure of consumer surplus improvement due to market globalization. This study shows that the measure of consumer surplus improvement has the largest value in symmetry, i.e., in the situation where the values of parameters describing producers are identical.
The justification of the measure used in this study is presented in Section 2. The description of the model investigated is given in Section 3. The cases of profit and producer surplus degradation are presented in Section 4. In the section, it is shown that the measure of producer surplus degradation has the largest value in some cases of completely symmetry among producers and markets. The concluding remarks of this paper are given in Section 5.
Measure of Coincident Surplus Degradation or Improvement
Examine here the case of coincident production surplus degradation. In the systems studied by Kameda et al. (2001a; 2001b) , cost degradation means cost increase, but in the system considered here, surplus degradation means surplus decrease. This difference brings about some differences in expressions on degradation between the two types of systems. Consider the inverse of the ratio of the surplus for a producer after globalization to that before globalization, as the degree of surplus degradation for the producer, due to globalization. The lowest of the degrees of surplus degradation among prodicers, is considered as the measure of degradation, for the following reason. A larger value of the measure means the situation of higher conincident degradation. Even in overall optimization where surplus degradation for all producers never occurs, there is some possibility that a part of producers suffer surplus degradation while other producers can definitely enjoy surplus improvement. Therefore, situations where only a part of producers suffer surplus degradation may not be considered paradoxical as far as other producers enjoy surplus improvement. There may exist various measures for overall optimization. Consider overall measures that are weighted means of surpluses for producers. Most commonly used is the one with identical weight factors for all producers, e.g., the total sum of surpluses divided by the number of producers. Consider, furthermore, the situation where one producer has surplus degradation and another has not. Then, one overall measure that has a large weight factor for the surplus of the former producer, degrades, and another measure that has a large weight factor for the latter producer, improves. Thus even though an overall measure degrades, the entire situation does not look paradoxical if a part of producers enjoy surplus improvement. The lowest of the degrees of surplus degradation among producers is considered the measure of coincident surplus degradation, since all producers suffer the degree of surplus degradation not lower than the lowest. Then, all of overall weighted mean measures degrade if and only if this measure degrades.
These are illustrated as follows. Assume that there exist producers 1, 2, · · · , n. Denote by R i the surplus of producer i. Denote byR i andR i , respectively, the surpluses of producer i before and after globalization. Denote
Consider an overall measure S = i α i R i where α i is the weight factor for producer i and i α i = 1. Denote by S b and S a , respectively, the values of S before and after globalization. Then,
That is, all of the overall measures suffer the degree not weaker than 1/k R . But, if k i = k R > 1 for some i, there is an overall measure S for which S a /S b > 1 with sufficiently large α i ( 1).
The discussion on comsumer durplus improvement can be presented in a similar way as above.
The Model and Assumptions
The system considered here consists of n producers and n corresponding markets. Producers and markets are numbered 1, 2, · · · , n. In each market, the commodity of the same and single kind is demanded. There is one producer at each market. Consider the two cases as to the market. 1) Markets are separated, and each producer serves only the demand of the corresponding market.
2) Markets are united into a globalized market. Call it market w.
Let q i denote the quantity that producer i produces. Define vector q such that q (q 1 , q 2 , · · · , q n ). q i is the variable determined by producer i. Assume the demand function of each separated market as follows: Denote by p i the price of the commodity in the market i. Then, p i = a(1 − q i /b i ). That is, b i is the upper bound of the demand for the commodity in the market i. Then, the upper bound of the demand in the globalized market w must be i b i . Therefore, if p w is the price in the globalized market,
Assume that the cost that producer i produces the amount q i of the commodity is c i q i + d i . d i is the fixed cost of producer i. The revenues of producers and consumers are assumed to be independent. Thus, macroeconomic aspects are not considered.
1) Before uniting the markets
The profit Π i 0 of producer i is the following:
Therefore, the optimal decision by producer i is expressed as follows:
Denote byq = (q 1 ,q 2 , · · · ,q n ), the set of values of q 1 , q 2 , · · · , q n that satisfy
2) After uniting the markets The profit Π i of producer i is the following:
Denote byq = (q 1 ,q 2 , · · · ,q n ) such values of q 1 , q 2 , · · · , q n that satisfy, for i = 1, 2, · · · , n,
If the system has such a solutionq of q that satisfies (6) for all i at the same time, it is a Nash equilibrium.
Producer and consumer surpluses Define the following.
R i denotes the surplus for producer i.R i andR i , respectively, denote the values of R i before and after globalization. C i denotes the consumer surplus for market i.C i andC i , respectively, denote the values of C i before and after globalization. k R i and k C i , respectively, denote the ratios, of the surplus for producer i and of the consumer surplus for market i, after globalization to those before globalization. That is,
k R and k C are defined as follows:
1/k R and k C , respectively, are considered the measures of coincident producer surplus degradation and consumer surplus improvement, due to globalization.
The Results

The profit optimization
The partial derivatives of Π i 0 and Π i are:
Therefore, optimal decisions and prices, before and after globalization, satisfy the following.
Then,q
Denote Z i = 1 − c i /a and Z = 1 − C/a. Thus, the surpluses for producer i, before and after globalization, are:
Define y i and z i as follows:
Therefore, the ratio, k R i , of surplus degradation for producer i is:
On the other hand, the consumer surplus in each market is as follows. Before globalization, the consumer surplus for market i is
After globalization, the quantity,q (c) i of the commodity that the consumers in the market i consume is to be b i (1 −p/a) . Then, the consumer surplus for market i is
Therefore, the ratio, k C i , of consumer surplus improvement for market i is:
The case where the coincident producer surplus degradation occurs
From (20), it is seen that, for larger b i (larger y i ) of the market size and for a larger c i (smaller z i , lower productivity), the surplus degradation for producer i is stronger. In complete symmetry, i.e., y i = 0
If there are producers with higher productivity (smaller c i ) and with the smaller market size (smaller b i ), they may have weaker (less) surplus degradation and even surplus improvement. In the following subsection, it will be proved that there exists producer i such k R i ≤ 4n/(n+1) 2 < 1. Thus, at least one producer has surplus degradation due to globalization.
By noting that the price at each market before globalization isp i = (a + c i )/2, and that the price in the globalized market isp = (a + nC)/(n + 1). Then, since it is assumed that a > c i , for all i, and then a > C, it follows that
That is, customers of at least one market can enjoy the reduction in the price by uniting the market. If c i = C, for all i, then, in some symmetry, the consumers of all markets enjoy the reduction of the price. Then, in symmetry s.t. c i = C for all i, from (21) and (22), it follows that
From (23), it is seen that, for market i with lower producer productivity (larger c i , smaller z i ), the consumer surplus improvement is stronger. If there exist some markets with higher producer productivity (smaller c i ), they may have less consumer surplus improvement and even surplus degradation, due to globalization. In the following subsection, it is proved that there exists producer i such k R i ≤ 4n/(n + 1) 2 < 1. Thus, at least one market has consumer surplus improvement due to globalization, which agrees with the above discussion based on pricing.
The above tendencies agree with our intuition.
The case where the coincident producer surplus degradation is worst
Consider a group of systems for which the values of parameters b 1 , b 2 , · · · , b n , c 1 , c 2 , · · · , c n satisfy the following constraints, given B and C.
Then, it follows that i Z i /n = Z = 1 − C/a is a constant, and i y i = i z i = 0. Denote the set of parameter values that satisfy the above constraint by C. Denote the vectors y = (y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y n ) and z = (z 1 , z 2 , · · · , z n ).
Lemma 1 The following inequality cannot hold for all i, except the case where y i
where l y l = l z l = 0, A ≥ n + 1, |y i | < 1 and |z i | < 1, for all i.
[Proof] 1) Consider the case where either of y = 0 or z = 0 holds.
1-1) Consider the case where z = 0, i.e., z i = 0 for all i. Then
Suppose there exists y( 0) s.t. ξ(y i , 0) ≤ 1, for all i. Then by noting that i y i = 0, there must exist y k s.t. y k < 0, which contradicts the above inequality. Then, it follows that the above lemma holds when z = 0.
1-2) Consider the case where y = 0, i.e., y i = 0 for all i. Suppose there exists y( 0) s.t. ξ(y i , 0) ≤ 1, i.e., 1 + Az i ≤ 1 + z i , for all i. In a similar way as 1-1), it follows that the above lemma holds when y = 0.
2) Consider the case where both y 0 and z 0 hold. The above lemma can be proved by induction as follows.
2-1) Show by contradiction that this lemma holds for n = 2. Suppose that there exist y 1 = −y 2 = y 0 and
The above two relations hold together only if y×z > 0. Without losing generality, assume 1 > y, z > 0. Then,
From the above, follows 1 + A 2 z 2 ≤ 1 + z 2 + 2yz. Then, A 2 z ≤ z + 2y, and
Then, from (27) and (28),
which results in 2[(A + 1)z − 2] + (A + 1)(1 − z) 2 = (A + 1)(1 + z 2 ) − 4 ≤ 0, but this is impossible since A ≥ 3 and 1 > z > 0 by assumption. Thus, we have z = z 1 = z 2 = 0, and as seen in 1-1), y = y 1 = y 2 = 0 Thus, it is shown that the above lemma holds for n = 2.
2-2) Assume that the above lemma holds for n = k. Then, show that it holds for n = k + 1, as in the following. Suppose that the above lemma holds for z 0. Then, there must exists l s.t. z l > 0. Without losing generality, numbering can be changed s.t. z k+1 > 0. Denote Z = z k+1 > 0. Then
where
Then, from the assumption on induction, there exists i s.t.
By noting (25) and from the supposition,
From (32) and (33), respectively,
By adding both sides of the above two relations,
Therefore,
From (34) and (35),
From (36),
from which follows
which contradicts (32). Thus, the lemma must hold for n = k + 1. Therefore, the lemma holds for arbitrary n ≥ 2.
Lemma 2
The following inequality cannot hold for all i, except the case where z i = 0 for all i.
where i z i = 0 and |z i | > 1 for all i.
[Proof] It is shown in a similar way as 1-1) in the proof of Lemma 1. 
Thus, from Lemma 1, by noting (8), k R = 4n/(n + 1) 2 if and only if y = z = 0, i.e., if the system is in complete symmetry.
Remark 4.1 4n/(n + 1) 2 decreases in n, and 4n/(n + 1) 2 → 0 as n → ∞. Therefore, as the number of markets to be united increases, the degree of coincident production surplus degradation becomes worse, and finally the system approaches the situation where every producer has no surplus.
Proposition 2 Consider the group of systems that satisfy the constraint C. The best ratio, k C , of coincident consumer surplus improvement for all markets due to globalization is 4n 2 /(n + 1) 2 . It is reached in symmetry, i.e., c i = C, and thus z i = 0, for all i.
[Proof] By noting (21) and (22) Thus, from Lemma 2, by noting (8), k C = 4n 2 /(n + 1) 2 if and only if z = 0, i.e., if the system is in symmetry.
Remark 4.2 4n
2 /(n + 1) 2 increases in n, and 4n 2 /(n + 1) 2 → 4 as n → ∞. Therefore, as the number of markets to be united increases, the degree of coincident consumer surplus improvement becomes greater, and finally the system approaches the situation where the consumers of every market enjoy the consumer surplus, after globalization, that is 4 times of that before globalization.
Concluding Remarks
The present paper has examined the system consisting of multiple producers that produce the commodity of a single kind. Considered is the effect of uniting the markets each of which a producer monopolizes. It can be seen that there exist cases where such globalization may bring the profit and surplus degradation to all producers. This paper has examined a system that has linear production and demand functions. Macroeconomic aspects are not considered. It has been shown that the measure of such surplus degradation for all producers due to globalization is worst when the system is in complete symmetry. This paper examined a rather specific model for analytical tractability, but the results would give insight into the problems, which may hold in more general situations or in different contexts. These might suggest the future problems to be investigated further. In general, symmetric models are more analytically tractable than asymmetric ones, but this study suggests that the analysis of symmetric Nash equilibria may be meaningful not only because of analytical tractability but also because they may present the best or worst cases.
